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A NEW APPROACH TO JURISDICTIONAL QUESTIONS IN
TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS
RAYMOND PARETZKY*
A feature of the modern global economy is an ever-increasing
amount of transnational litigation. If a stable, harmonious system of
international legal order is to be nurtured, the courts that entertain
these lawsuits must consider a range of foreign policy factors not pre-
sent in purely domestic litigation. The state and federal judiciary in the
United States, however, has not been sufficiently sensitive to the inter-
national implications of cases involving foreign transactions, incidents,
or litigants. First, varying judicial approaches to dealing with such
cases have prevented the United States from speaking with a single,
consistent voice on the issues raised in transnational litigation. Second,
the United States has been guilty of serious breaches of the comity of
nations when its courts have engaged in ad hoc decisionmaking in in-
ternational cases that unnecessarily frustrates the policies, offends the
sovereignty, and disparages the legal systems of other nations.
In response to these problems, this article proposes a coherent,
principled approach to handling the important jurisdictional issues that
arise in transnational cases. Part 1 looks at the current state of the law
of jurisdiction in international litigation. Part 2 examines the flaws in
current law, focusing on its adverse impact on the foreign policy of the
United States. Finally, Part 3 suggests a new approach to resolving
jurisdictional questions in transnational cases, outlining a framework
based on explicit judicial consideration of the foreign policy implica-
tions of alternative jurisdictional decisions.
1. JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL CASES: CURRENT
LAW
Currently, state and federal courts generally have wide latitude to
decide jurisdictional questions in international cases,1 subject only to
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1 This article defines "international" or "transnational" cases as all lawsuits in-
volving foreign transactions, incidents, or litigants. If no foreign nation has significant
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the same minimum standards of due process that apply in purely do-
mestic cases.' The following sections explore the prevailing law with
respect to four important jurisdictional issues: personal jurisdiction, fo-
rum non conveniens, choice of law, and enforcement of judgments.
1.1. Personal Jurisdiction
In the domestic context, both state and federal courts assert per-
sonal jurisdiction over defendants subject to the constraints of the due
process clause.' As interpreted by the Supreme Court, due process re-
quires that a defendant have "purposefully established 'minimum con-
tacts' in the forum State,"" "such that the maintenance of the suit does
not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' "5
The focus of the due process inquiry is on "the relationship among the
defendant, the forum, and the litigation."6
The Court's interpretation of the due process clause permits the
states wide latitude in setting the outer boundaries of the jurisdictional
reach of their courts. Taking advantage of the Court's framework,
states have adopted "long-arm statutes," which provide for expansive
assertions of personal jurisdiction.7 A federal court sitting in diversity is
required to apply the long-arm statute of the state in which it sits.'
In international cases, the Supreme Court until recently treated
foreign non-resident defendants exactly like domestic ones.9 Nonethe-
interests at stake in a particular case, however, then under the approach advocated by
this article, see infra Part 3.2, the foreign elements will not have an impact on a court's
resolution of jurisdictional issues.
I Enforcement of judgments is an exception; see infra Part 1.4.
3 U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
" Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985) (citing Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
1 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milli-
ken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
6 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977).
7 Long-arm statutes include those that list various acts the performance of which
subjects a non-domiciliary to jurisdiction, see, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 302
(McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1989), those that permit the assertion of jurisdiction to the
maximum extent allowed by the due process clause, see, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §
410.10 (West 1973), and those that do both, see, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5322
(Purdon 1981 & Supp. 1988). See L. BRILMAYER, AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISDIC-
TION IN THE AMERICAN FEDERAL SYSTEM 22-23 (1986).
1 Born, Reflections on Judicial Jurisdiction in International Cases, 17 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 7 n.23 (1987).
' See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984);
Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); Born, supra note 8, at 6.
In Helicopteros, the Court applied the domestic version of minimum contacts to the
foreign defendant despite the fact that both sides, as well as the United States as amicus
curiae, had argued the issue of the degree of protection to which alien defendants are
entitled under the due process clause. See L. BRILMAYER, supra note 7, at 291-92.
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less, lower courts have evolved various approaches to jurisdictional
challenges by foreign defendants. In state law cases, while most state
and federal courts have applied domestic due process standards to juris-
dictional challenges by foreigners, some have exercised jurisdiction only
when contacts between the alien defendant and the forum were greater
than those needed in domestic cases have expressly or in fact subjected
foreigners to personal jurisdiction on the basis of contacts below the
minimum required for U.S. defendants.10
In its 1987 decision in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior
Court of California, Solano County,i" however, the Supreme Court
hinted that its perspective may be changing. Although the Asahi Court
applied the standard minimum contacts test to the foreign defendant,
the Court indicated that "the international context" of the case was one
factor in its decision to hold a California court's exercise of personal
jurisdiction "unreasonable and unfair."' 2 Justice O'Connor, in a sec-
tion of the opinion joined by seven other justices, wrote that in interna-
tional cases, courts must
consider the procedural and substantive policies of other na-
tions whose interests are affected by the assertion of jurisdic-
tion .... [T]hose interests, as well as the federal interest in
its foreign relations policies, will be best served by a careful
inquiry into the reasonableness of the assertion of jurisdic-
tion in the particular case, and an unwillingness to find the
serious burdens on an alien defendant outweighed by mini-
mal interests on the part of the plaintiff or the forum State.
"Great care and reserve should be exercised when extending
our notions of personal jurisdiction into the international
field."'"
Asahi is a step in the direction of abandonment by the Court of the
notion that the minimum contacts standard is as suitable for foreign as
for U.S. defendants. However, rather than formulating a new test for
use in litigation involving alien defendants, Asahi viewed the foreign
aspect of a case as only one factor in a personal jurisdiction calculus
that is otherwise the same as that employed in purely domestic litiga-
tion. Moreover, the Court provided no guidelines for the lower courts
as to how much weight to afford the fact that a defendant is foreign
10 Born, supra note 8, at 6-9.
IL 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
12 Id. at 116.
IS Id. at 115 (emphasis in original) (quoting United States v. First Nat'l City
Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 404 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
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when applying the minimum contacts standard.
In federal question cases, a different problem has divided courts on
the issue of personal jurisdiction over alien defendants. While the ma-
jority of federal courts consider a defendant's contacts with the state in
which the court sits, others expand their jurisdictional reach over for-
eign defendants by aggregating a defendant's contacts with the United
States as a whole.14 In Asahi, the Supreme Court expressly declined to
consider the question of "whether Congress could, consistent with the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, authorize federal court
personal jurisdiction over alien defendants based on the aggregate of
national contacts."1 5
1.2. Forum Non Conveniens
Under the forum non conveniens doctrine, a court may dismiss a
case of which it has jurisdiction upon a finding that a more convenient
forum exists elsewhere. The leading decision on forum non conveniens
is Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert.
1 6
The Gilbert Court outlined two sets of factors to be balanced by
trial judges in deciding whether to grant a motion for forum non con-
veniens. The factors affecting the private interests of the litigants in-
clude the
relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of com-
pulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of
obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view
of premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and
all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy,
expeditious and inexpensive. There may also be questions as
to the enforcibility [sic] of a judgment if one is obtained."7
The public interest factors include administrative difficulties due to
court congestion; the "local interest in having localized controversies de-
cided at home";' 8 the unfairness of burdening residents of an unrelated
forum with jury duty; and the avoidance of unnecessary problems in
14 Born, supra note 8, at 9-10. The federal courts generally agree that such aggre-
gation is appropriate in actions where Congress has provided for nationwide service of
process, on the rationale that aggregation treats aliens equivalently to U.S. defendants,
who under the statutes are amenable to personal jurisdiction in all federal courts re-
gardless of their contacts. L. BRILMAYER, supra note 7, at 293.
16 480 U.S. at 113 n.* (emphasis in original).
16 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
17 Id. at 508.
18 Id. at 509.
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the conflict of laws or in the application of foreign law.'9
In federal courts, when transfer of a case to another federal court
is sought, common law forum non conveniens analysis has been super-
seded by the Federal Transfer Statute.20 The Gilbert factors still apply,
however, when a defendant claims that a state or foreign court would
be a more convenient forum for a lawsuit. In addition, many states
have adopted forum non conveniens as a matter of common law, and a
few have codified the doctrine in statutes.2
In Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno,22 the Supreme Court revisited the
subject of forum non conveniens. Reversing a lower court ruling that
plaintiffs may defeat forum non conveniens motions by showing that
the law which would be applied in the alternate forum is less favorable
to the plaintiffs than that of the chosen forum, the Court, in an opinion
by Justice Marshall, held that "[t]he possibility of a change in substan-
tive law should ordinarily not be given conclusive or even substantial
weight in the forum non conveniens inquiry. 23 Only "if the remedy
provided by the alternative forum is so clearly inadequate or unsatisfac-
tory that it is no remedy at all, [may] the unfavorable change in law
. . . be given substantial weight. '2 4 Justice Marshall explained that
the rule adopted by the court of appeals would mandate trials in
plainly inconvenient forums, was inflexible, would often require com-
plex choice of law analysis, and would result in a flood of litigation into
U.S. courts by foreign plaintiffs suing U.S. manufacturers.25
19 Id. at 508-09.
20 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1982) (permitting transfers to other venues for the conve-
nience of the parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice).
21 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.30 (West 1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
47.122 (West Supp. 1988); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 223A, § 5 (West 1986).
22 454 U.S. 235 (1981). Reyno involved an airplane crash in Scotland; the dece-
dents and their heirs and next of kin were all Scottish residents. The plane had been
manufactured by a Pennsylvania corporation and the propellers by an Ohio corpora-
tion. A California probate court appointed the plaintiff, Reyno, administratix of the
estates of the five passengers, and she brought wrongful death actions against the two
corporations in California. After the case had been removed to federal court and then
transferred to a Pennsylvania district court, both defendants moved for forum non con-
veniens dismissals. The district court granted the motions, and the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit reversed. Id.
2 Id. at 247. Only seven justices participated in the Reyno decision. Of these, five
joined this section of the Court's opinion.
24 Id. at 254. The court cites as an example of a situation in which dismissal
would be inappropriate a case in which the foreign forum does not allow litigation of
the subject matter of the dispute. Id. at 254 n.22.
25 Id. at 247-52. The Court noted that U.S. courts "are already extremely attrac-
tive to foreign plaintiffs," because of the strict liability rules-offered in most states; the
potential choice among 50 jurisdictions, each with "its own set of malleable choice-of-
law rules"; the availability of jury trials in the United States; the U.S. fee system, in
which courts allow contingency fees and do not tax losing parties with their opponents'
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The Court also ruled that the district court correctly afforded re-
duced deference to the plaintiff's choice of forum because the real par-
ties in interest were foreign. When the home forum has been chosen,
the Court held, it is reasonable to assume that the choice is convenient;
when a plaintiff chooses a foreign forum, however, this assumption is
much less reasonable: "Because the central purpose of any forum non
conveniens inquiry is to ensure that the trial is convenient, a foreign
plaintiff's choice deserves less deference." 26 Since the trial court did not
commit a clear abuse of discretion, the Court concluded, it should not
have been reversed.
In Reyno, the Supreme Court left undecided the question of
whether under Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins28 a federal district court
should apply state or federal forum non conveniens law in a diversity
case,29 noting that the lower courts in the litigation had concluded that
state forum non conveniens law was virtually identical to federal law."
Many other lower federal courts have likewise avoided the Erie ques-
tion by finding no significant difference between state and federal fo-
rum non conveniens law. 1
Some federal courts, however, have been forced to deal with the
Erie problem in forum non conveniens diversity cases; 2 nearly unani-
legal fees; and the extensive discovery available in litigation in this country. Id. at 252
& n.18.
26 Id. at 255-56 (footnote omitted).
27 Id. at 257-60. Four of the seven participating justices joined this section of the
majority opinion.
28 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
29 The Gilbert Court had also avoided this issue, asserting that the result in the
case would be the same under state or federal law. See 330 U.S. at 509; see also Wil-
liams v. Green Bay & W. R.R., 326 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1946).
o 454 U.S. at 248 n.13.
31 See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, La., 789 F.2d 1092,
1096 n.3 (5th Cir. 1986); Hafner v. Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, 616 F. Supp.
735, 741 (N.D. Ind. 1985); Fraizer v. St. Jude Medical, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1129, 1131
n.1 (D. Minn. 1985); American Home Assurance Co. v. Insurance Corp. of Ir., 603 F.
Supp. 636, 640 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
32 This occurs when state forum non conveniens law diverges from federal law.
Florida law, for example, precludes a forum non conveniens dismissal of an action
when one of the parties is a resident. See Sibaja v. Dow Chemical Co., 757 F.2d 1215,
1217 (11th Cir. 1985). In New York, state forum non conveniens law appears to have
diverged from federal law in that the New York State Court of Appeals, in Islamic
Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 62 N.Y.2d 474, 481, 478 N.Y.S.2d 597, 601, 467 N.E.2d
245, 249 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1108 (1985), held that the availability of an
alternative forum is not a prerequisite to forum non conveniens dismissal. See Agy-
enkwa v. American Motors Corp., 622 F. Supp. 242, 244 n.4 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). More-
over, now that California courts have declined to follow Reyno, see infra note 39 and
accompanying text, federal law and the forum non conveniens law of that state have
unquestionably diverged. Finally, in Reyno, the Supreme Court noted that the lower
courts in the litigation had concluded that Pennsylvania and California forum non con-
veniens law was virtually identical to federal law. 454 U.S. at 248 n.13. Since the
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mously, they have concluded that federal courts ought to follow federal
forum non conveniens law, not the laws of the states in which they
sit.33 Still other courts have implicitly indicated their determination that
federal law is applicable by considering only federal precedents and
thus ignoring the question of whether the forum non conveniens laws of
their states are identical to federal law. 4 There are no cases in which a
federal court has applied state forum non conveniens law that conflicted
with Supreme Court precedent.
In many states, forum non conveniens law is very similar to the
federal doctrine as described in Gilbert.35 Likewise, in international
cases, most state courts that have ruled on forum non conveniens mo-
tions have applied the holdings of Reyno, although without necessarily
accepting the case as binding federal common law."6 One state, Minne-
sota, has explicitly adopted Reyno's precepts into state law.37 However,
a court in Connecticut refused to order a forum non conveniens dismis-
sal in a case in which Reyno would seem to have required it,38 and
Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit on the content of federal forum non con-
veniens law, however, state law could not possibly have been identical both to the
Third Circuit version of federal law and to the Supreme Court version. See Holmes v.
Syntex Laboratories, Inc., 156 Cal. App. 3d 372, 380, 202 Cal. Rptr. 773, 777-78
(1984).
*1 See, e.g., Sibaja, 757 F.2d at 1219; Alexander v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 541
F. Supp. 93, 97-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (dictum); Fiorenza v. United States Steel Int'l,
311 F. Supp. 117, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); cf. Lapides v. Doner, 248 F. Supp. 883, 891-
92 (E.D. Mich. 1965) (holding that federal courts are not obliged to follow state rule
declining jurisdiction in cases involving internal affairs of out-of-state corporations, and
that Weiss v. Routh, 149 F.2d 193 (2d Cir. 1945), contra, is no longer good law). But
cf. Ramirez v. Autobuses Blancos Flecha Roja, 486 F.2d 493, 496 (5th Cir. 1973)
(following Texas rule that wrongful death statute does not provide cause of action for
injuries that occur out of state).
"' See, e.g., Transunion Corp. v. Pepsico, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 1211 (S.D.N.Y.
1986); Carlenstolpe v. Merck & Co., 638 F. Supp. 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Ledingham v.
Parke-Davis Div. of Warner-Lambert Co., 628 F. Supp. 1447 (E.D.N.Y. 1986); Zin-
sler v. Marriott Corp., 605 F. Supp. 1499 (D. Md. 1985).
13 See L. BRILMAYER, supra note 7, at 150.
38 For example, in one case the Illinois Supreme Court cited state and federal
precedents interchangeably in arriving at conclusions consistent with the Reyno doc-
trine. See Jones v. Searle Laboratories, 93 Ill. 2d 366, 67 Ill. Dec. 118, 444 N.E.2d 157
(1982). A New York court reached a similar result without relying on either state or
federal precedent. See Bewers v. American Home Products Corp., 99 A.D.2d 949, 472
N.Y.S.2d 637 (1984). An Indiana court, in dismissing a suit against a U.S. drug com-
pany by U.K. residents, followed federal decisions, noting that "there is a sufficient
similarity in the spirit of the state and federal rules as they relate to the doctrine of
forum non conveniens in the context of international litigation that we deem them to be
appropriate authority in deciding this appeal." McCracken v. Eli Lilly & Co., 494
N.E.2d 1289, 1292 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
8 See Bergquist v. Medtronic, Inc., 379 N.W.2d 508, 512-13 (Minn. 1986).
3 In Miller v. United Technologies Corp., 40 Conn. Supp. 457, 515 A.2d 390
(Super. Ct. 1986), the estates of two members of the Egyptian Air Force who were
killed in a fighter plane crash in Egypt brought a products liability suit against the
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courts in California have explicitly rejected the Reyno doctrine.3 9
1.3. Choice of Law
States use a variety of methods to settle choice of law questions,
which arise when a court must choose the rule of decision on a point at
issue from among the laws of two or more jurisdictions. One scholar
has counted approximately ten different methods used by state courts.40
This article will sketch only the most common approaches.
The traditional theory, still followed by approximately twenty
states,4 is the "vested rights" approach of the First Restatement.4 2 Ac-
cording to the Restatement, courts must apply the law of the state in
which the rights of the parties have vested, which is the state in which
the last act necessary to create a legal obligation occurred.43 For each
substantive area of law (e.g., torts, property, or contracts), the Restate-
ment offers a set of rules to determine, in any case that may arise,
which state is entitled to have its law applied. The Restatement has
been subject to much criticism, on the grounds that its rules are arbi-
trary in derivation, rigid in application, and short-sighted in result.44
The most radical critics of the Restatement, led by Professor Brai-
nerd Currie, proposed an entirely different solution to conflicts
problems, a policy-oriented approach known as "interest analysis."4
Under interest analysis, courts first examine the substantive policies
underlying each competing jurisdiction's law; if only one jurisdiction is
U.S. plane manufacturers. The Connecticut trial court found that Egypt was an ade-
quate alternative forum, that Egyptian law would apply regardless of the forum, and
that the public interest factors weighed in favor of an Egyptian forum. Id. at 463-67,
515 A.2d at 394-96. Nevertheless, based on a close balancing of private interest factors,
including "a dispute as to how dangerous it would be for Americans to be in Egypt on
a trial of this nature," id. at 465, 515 A.2d at 395, the court ruled that the presumption
in favor of the plaintiff's choice of forum had not been overcome and denied the defend-
ants' motion for forum non conveniens dismissal. Id. at 467, 515 A.2d at 396. The
opinion never refers to the Reyno holding that a foreign plaintiff's forum choice de-
serves less deference. This is so despite the court's having cited and followed another
holding from Reyno, that a court should not be swayed by a showing that the law of the
alternative forum is less favorable to the plaintiffs than that of their chosen forum. Id.
at 461, 515 A.2d at 393.
'9 See Corrigan v. Bjork Shiley Corp., 182 Cal. App. 3d 166, 227 Cal. Rptr. 247
(1986); Holmes v. Syntex Laboratories, 156 Cal. App. 3d 372, 202 Cal. Rptr. 773
(1984); infra text accompanying notes 100-05, 126-30.
40 See Kay, Theory Into Practice: Choice of Law in the Courts, 34 MERCER L.
REV. 521, 585 (1983).
41 Id. at 582.
42 RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934).
41 See L. BRILMAYER, supra note 7, at 220.
4 See id. at 223-26.
41 See generally B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1963) (outlining interest analysis).
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found to have a legitimate interest in the application of its law-a case
of "false conflict"-then that jurisdiction's law is applied.46 In a "true
conflict" situation, when each of two or more states has a genuine in-
terest in the application of its own law, one of a variety of methods of
resolution that have been proposed is used to select the law to be ap-
plied.47 Like the vested rights approach, interest analysis has been
heavily criticized, most significantly because of its implicit assumption
that the primary policy goal of states is to advance the short-term inter-
ests of their residents."' Interest analysis in one of its many varieties is
used by the courts of about ten states.4"
The final major approach to choice of law problems, that of the
Second Restatement,50 represents a synthesis of the other approaches.
In some areas of law, the Second Restatement sets out a large number
of easily applied narrow rules; in other areas, including torts and con-
tracts, it offers flexible guidelines51 for choosing the jurisdiction with
"' See E. SCOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 17 (1982). The authors call the
notion of false conflicts "an analytic concept which is one of Currie's most important
contributions and which has found widespread acceptance in [U.S.] conflicts law since
Currie." Id.
"' Numerous scholars have suggested solutions to the problem presented by true
conflicts; among the most prominent proposed methods are those of Currie, Robert A.
Leflar, and William F. Baxter. Professor Currie advocated that courts faced with true
conflicts apply forum law; he believed that "assessment of the respective values of the
competing legitimate interests of two sovereign states ... is a political function of a very
high order ... which should not be committed to courts in a democracy." Currie, Notes
on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE L.J. 171, 176. Profes-
sor Baxter disagreed with this view of the role of the judiciary, and suggested that
Currie's approach be rejected in favor of a "comparative impairment" test: courts
weigh the competing interests and apply the law of the jurisdiction whose policies
would be most impaired if its law were not applied. See Baxter, Choice of Law and the
Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1963); Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d
313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1976) (adopting and applying the comparative
impairment test). Finally, Professor Leflar proposed a more explicitly value-oriented
approach, under which courts are guided by five "choice-influencing" considerations:
predictability of results, maintenance of interstate and international order, simplifica-
tion of the judicial task, advancement of the forum's governmental interests, and, most
controversially, application of the better rule of law. See R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CON-
FLICTS LAW 193-95, 205-19 (3d ed. 1977); Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d
205 (1966) (adopting and applying the better law approach). See generally E. SCOLES
& P. HAY, supra note 46, at 16-34; L. BRILMAYER, supra note 7, at 236-39.
, See L. BRILMAYER, supra note 7, at 239-43.
4 See Kay, supra note 40, at 544, 573.
o RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971).
5 Seven factors are set out:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant
policies of the forum, (c) the relevant policies of other interested states and
the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular
issue, (d) the protection of justified expectations, (e) the basic policies un-
derlying the particular field of law, (f) certainty, predictability and uni-
formity of result, and (g) ease in the determination and application of the
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the "most significant relationship" to a given case.5" The chief critique
of the Second Restatement has been that in the difficult cases, where
two or more states have equally significant relationships to an issue in
the case, it allows courts to choose either policy or rules to break the
deadlock.53 Approximately fourteen states have adopted the approach of
the Second Restatement.
54
Regardless of the choice of law method chosen, there are constitu-
tional limits on a state's power to apply local law to cases in which
another jurisdiction has an interest. Under the due process and full
faith and credit clauses, a state may assert jurisdiction over only those
cases with which it has a "sigificant contact or significant aggregation
of contacts, creating state interests. '55 In practice, however, the modern
Court is "[unwilling] to nullify the choice of forum law unless that
choice is completely without a rational basis."'5 6 In international cases,
the due process clause has afforded the Court a basis for performing a
constitutional analysis equivalent to that employed in purely domestic
cases.
57
Similarly, "[b]y and large, [U.S.] courts and writers have not dis-
tinguished between international and interstate conflicts for choice-of-
law purposes. Indeed some of the leading choice-of-law cases in this
country involved international conflicts, and, so far as appears, this fact
had no effect upon the ultimate decision."' 58 Thus, in deciding choice of
law questions, U.S. courts have generally paid little or no attention to
the foreign relations implications of international cases.
As for the federal courts, when sitting in a diversity case, a federal
court is required to employ the choice of law rules of the state in which
it sits,5" even in an international case.60 In contrast, if jurisdiction of an
international case is founded on a basis other than diversity, a federal
court must apply federal law; a finding that the law of another nation
should apply mandates dismissal of the case for lack of subject matter
law to be applied.
Id. § 6(2). This list of factors reflects the values of both the vested rights and interest
analysis approaches. See L. BRILMAYER, supra note 7, at 244.
52 See L. BRILMAYER, supra note 7, at 243-45.
11 See id. at 245-46.
Kay, supra note 40, at 556.
5 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313 (1981).
56 L. BRILMAYER, supra note 7, at 288.
5 See id. at 294-95; Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
58 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 10 reporter's note (1971).
The reporter notes that there are occasionally cases in which the international context
may lead the court to a different result. Id.
" Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941); see also Day &
Zimmerman, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3 (1975) (per curiam).
10 Day & Zimmerman, 423 U.S. 3.
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jurisdiction." In deciding whether federal law is applicable to a partic-
ular case, however, the courts enjoy a great deal of discretion; although
the Constitution theoretically would not allow the federal judiciary to
apply U.S. law to cases with no nexus to this country, "no court has
ever held the application of [U.S.] law to an international controversy
violative of due process." 2
1.4. Enforcement of Judgments
Even when a controversy is litigated abroad, the successful litigant
seeking to collect the fruits of victory may have to rely on the judiciary
of this country. This is so because the enforcement officers of a sover-
eign jurisdiction will not enforce a judgment of a foreign state until it
has been judicially converted into a local judgment. 3 Like the jurisdic-
tional issues discussed above, enforcement of judgment questions arise
in U.S. courts in both domestic and international contexts.
Domestically, the law of enforcement of judgments is controlled by
the full faith and credit clause of the U.S. Constitution. 4 Basically, the
clause requires "every [U.S.] court to recognize every judgment duly
rendered by every other [U.S.] court."65 The chief exceptions are that
the second jurisdiction need not enforce a non-final judgment,6 a judg-
ment issued by a court that lacked jurisdiction,67 a judgment superseded
by a contrary later judgment in another jurisdiction," and a judgment
on grounds other than the merits. 9
With regard to the enforcement of judgments of foreign nations in
either state or federal court, there appears to be no applicable constitu-
tional provision.7" Moreover, despite the fact that "recognition of for-
eign judgments has long been a subject of international concern, and
61 See Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
62 L. BRILMAYER, supra note 7, at 297. Expansive extraterritorial applications of
U.S. federal law, however, have generated a great deal of controversy. See RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403 reporters' note 1 (1986) and
sources cited therein.
63 D. SIEGEL, CONFLICTS IN A NUTSHELL 360 (1982).
4 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
63 D. SIEGEL, supra note 63, at 363; cf. L. BRILMAYER, supra note 7, at 178
("The requirement of full faith and credit not only extends to relations between courts
in sister states, but also requires both federal and state courts to give full faith and
credit to the other's proceedings.") (footnotes omitted).
66 See L. BRILMAYER, supra note 7, at 179.
67 See id. at 180-83.
68 See id. at 179-80.
69 See D. SIEGEL, supra note 63, at 374-75.
70 Cf. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 321 n.4 (1981) (Stevens, J., con-
curring) (noting that the full faith and credit clause is inapplicable in the choice of law
context when the law of a foreign nation is at issue). But see infra note 73.
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there is a wide network of bilateral and multilateral agreements con-
cerning reciprocal enforcement of civil judgments,' the United States
is not a party to any such treaty.72 Instead, U.S. courts generally are
guided by the principles of comity when deciding whether to enforce
judgments of foreign courts.7 3 In Hilton v. Guyot, Justice Gray wrote:
[W]here there has been opportunity for a full and fair trial
abroad before a court of competent jurisdiction, conducting
the trial upon regular proceedings, after due citation or vol-
untary appearance of the defendant, and under a system of
jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of
justice . . ., and there is nothing to show either prejudice in
the court, or in the system of laws under which it was sit-
ting, or fraud in procuring the judgment, or any other spe-
cial reason why the comity of this nation should not allow it
full effect, the merits of the case should not, in an action
brought in this country upon the judgment, be tried afresh..
74
In Hilton, the Court's comity analysis resulted in its adoption of
the rule of reciprocity, which, with some exceptions,7 5 grants conclusive
effect in U.S. courts to the judgments of a foreign nation only if that
nation grants reciprocal effect to analogous U.S. judgments.76 However,
"[t]hough that holding has not been formally overruled, it is no longer
followed in the great majority of State and federal courts in the United
States."
77
Foreign judgments law, as it emerges from the decisions of U.S.
71 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 481 reporters' note 6
at 601 (1986).
72 Id. ch. 8 introductory note at 592.
73 L. BRILMAYER, supra note 7, at 315. The Supreme Court has said that comity
"is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and
good will, upon the other." Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895). Professor
Henkin views this passage as rendering uncertain the constitutional status of interna-
tional comity, L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 454 & n.37
(1972), but the Court has never held that there is a constitutional requirement of judi-
cial adherence to even a minimum standard of international comity.
74 159 U.S. at 202-03.
75 See id. at 166-71.
76 Id. at 227-28.
77 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 481 comment d
(1986); see also id. reporters' note 1; D. SIEGEL, supra note 63, at 362 ("With the
advent of the Erie rule . . ., there is little left of Hilton."). But see Moore, Federalism
and Foreign Relations, 1965 DUKE L.J. 248, 263 ("[A] number of states have followed
the Hilton rule, regarding it as a Supreme Court determination on a foreign relations
question.") (citing Traders Trust Co. v. Davidson, 146 Minn. 224, 178 N.W. 735
(1920); Banco Minero v. Ross, 106 Tex. 522, 172 S.W. 711 (1915)).
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courts, 7 1 has recently been summarized in the Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations Law.7 1 In general, "a final judgment of a court of a
foreign state granting or denying recovery of a sum of money, establish-
ing or confirming the status of a person, or determining interests in
property, is conclusive between the parties, and is entitled to recogni-
tion in courts in the United States." 80 However, foreign judgments
should not be recognized if the foreign court lacked personal jurisdic-
tion or the foreign state lacked fair tribunals and procedures, l and
need not be recognized if the foreign court lacked subject matter juris-
diction or failed to provide sufficient notice, or if the judgment was
fraudulent, repugnant to U.S. or state public policy, superseded by a
conflicting later judgment, or violative of a forum selection clause. 82
2. THE ADVERSE IMPACT OF CURRENT LAW ON U.S. FOREIGN
RELATIONS
The current state of the law of jurisdiction in international cases,
as Part 1 demonstrates, is disarray. Instead of a uniform federal stan-
dard to guide courts in deciding cases with transnational implications,
there exists a variety of doctrines that possess a coherent relationship
neither to each other nor to the advancement of U.S. foreign policy.
Part 2.1 examines the adverse impact on U.S. foreign relations of al-
lowing jurisdictional issues in international cases to be subject to diver-
gent judicial approaches. Part 2.2 then looks at some of the defects of
current jurisdictional rules.
2.1. The Need for One Voice
One of the principal defects of the jumble of jurisdictional rules
that state and federal courts apply in transnational cases is that they
prevent the United States from having a single national position in an
important area of foreign affairs.83 As the Supreme Court has noted, it
38 There is no federal common law of enforcement of foreign judgments. See RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 481 comment a (1986).
11 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (1986).
80 Id. § 481(1).
81 Id. § 482(1).
82 Id. § 482(2). The Restatement affords separate treatment to tax and penal
judgments, divorce decrees, and custody and support orders. See id. §§ 483-486.
83 This problem has prompted various commentators to argue that each of the
jurisdictional issues discussed in this article should be treated in international cases as
areas of federal common law binding on the states. See, e.g., Born,.supra note 8, at 27-
34; Greenberg, The Appropriate Source of Law for Forum Non Conveniens Decisions
in International Cases: A Proposal for the Development of Federal Common Law, 4
INT'L TAX & Bus. LAW. 155, 179-85 (1986); Note, Application by Federal Courts of
State Rules on Conflicts of Laws, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 1403, 1405-09 (1941);
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is essential that the nation "speak with one voice when regulating com-
mercial relations with foreign governments."84
The "one voice" standard was most recently discussed by the Su-
preme Court in Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles.8" Japan
Line concerned a California tax that was levied on foreign shipping
containers used exclusively in international commerce. The Court, after
noting that state burdens on foreign commerce require "a more exten-
sive constitutional inquiry" than comparable burdens on interstate com-
merce, 86 ruled the tax unconstitutional, finding that it violated the
Commerce Clause by "impair[ing] federal uniformity in an area where
federal uniformity is essential. Foreign commerce is preeminently a
matter of national concern."87
The Court deemed federal uniformity essential for several reasons
that are as applicable to rules of jurisdiction as to foreign commerce
clause doctrines. First, and most basically, the United States is but one
state in the global community. If the country is to be a responsi-
ble-and effective-member of that family of nations, it must comply
with international law and practice and afford comity to other states.
Only through national laws can these duties be fulfilled. "[R]egulation
'must of necessity be national in its character' when it affects 'a subject
which concerns our international relations, in regard to which foreign
nations ought to be considered and their rights respected.' "88 In the
first instance, it is for Congress and the President to fashion these na-
tional laws. When they have failed to act, however, it is incumbent
upon the federal judiciary to fill the void 9 by creating federal rules of
Horowitz, Toward a Federal Common Law of Choice of Law, 14 UCLA L. REV. 1191
(1967) & Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV.
489, 513-15 (1954) (both arguing more generally for federal common law in all diver-
sity cases); Moore, supra note 77, at 254-56, 261-65, 275-77; Reese, The Status in this
Country of Judgments Rendered Abroad, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 783, 788 (1950).
" Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976).
85 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
88 Id. at 446.
81 Id. at 448; cf. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 n.25
(1964) ("Various constitutional and statutory provisions indirectly support [the deter-
mination that the scope of the act of state doctrine is a matter of federal common law]
by reflecting a concern for uniformity in this country's dealings with foreign nations
and indicating a desire to give matters of international significance to the jurisdiction of
federal institutions.") (citations omitted); Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Prov-
ince of B.C. v. Gilbertson, 597 F.2d 1161, 1163 (9th Cir. 1979) (noting that the issue
of whether U.S. courts should honor foreign tax judgments "carries foreign relations
overtones" which may mandate that federal law be applied).
88 Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 449 n.13 (quoting Henderson v. Mayor of New York,
92 U.S. 259, 273 (1876)).
8" The separation of powers argument that the judiciary should take no position
in foreign affairs matters is not tenable when applied to issues of legislative and adjudi-
cative jurisdiction. When lawsuits are filed, courts must act; refusals to assert jurisdic-
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jurisdiction.90
A second problem associated with the lack of national uniformity
on transnational jurisdiction issues is hinderance of U.S. international
trade. For example, as long as each state is allowed to apply its own
choice of law rules to international cases, foreign litigants are unable to
predict what substantive law will be applied if they are parties to law-
suits in U.S. courts. Similarly, the varying state approaches to the mini-
mum content of "minimum contacts" with regard to foreign litigants,
and the split in federal courts on the "national contacts" test, leave non-
U.S. businesspersons uncertain about where in this country they can be
sued and where they cannot. As one commentator has noted with re-
gard to personal jurisdiction:
[T]here is a special need for uniform treatment of jurisdic-
tional issues. Foreigners often will come from legal, cultural,
and economic environments that differ significantly from
their United States counterparts. As a result, clear, uniform
jurisdictional rules in United States courts are necessary to
prevent surprise and permit effective business planning.9 1
The likely result of the uncertainty that currently prevails on these is-
sues is that some deals do not get done, while others include conces-
sions-such as forum selection clauses mandating that any litigation be
tried abroad-made by the U.S. party in order to reassure its nervous
foreign counterpart.
Third, state freedom to take an independent line on jurisdictional
questions in international matters can undercut the negotiating strength
of the United States. For example, in Hilton v. Guyot,92 the Supreme
Court held that a foreign nation's judgments would be enforceable in
this country only to the extent that U.S. judgments were enforceable in
that nation. 3 A number of state courts, however, rejected the Court's
position.9 According to Professor Moore, the position taken by the
tion and applications of foreign law have no fewer foreign policy implications than do
assertions of jurisdiction and applications of domestic law. In the absence of direction
from the political branches, therefore, the courts must fashion for themselves jurisdic-
tional rules that are sensitive to the position of the United States as a leading proponent
of world order and comity among nations.
90 Because jurisdictional rules are judicially created doctrines, they are particu-
larly well suited for judicially legislated federal common law. See L. HENKIN, supra
note 73, at 219.
91 Born, supra note 8, at 11 (footnote omitted).
2 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
9 See supra text accompanying notes 73-77.
E.g., Johnston v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 242 N.Y. 381, 152
N.E. 121 (1926); see Moore, supra note 77, at 254-55 & n.34, 261-65.
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states "to some extent undermined the international bargaining power
of the United States with respect to this problem."95 His conclusion
was that "the independent state positions regarding the problem, al-
though perhaps more enlightened on the merits, failed to achieve the
foreign relations goal sought, namely the recognition of United States
judgments abroad by reciprocity nations. Thus, the lesson of Hilton
reaffirms that the voice of foreign relations must be a federal voice." 96
Finally, lack of national uniformity on transnational issues exacer-
bates the dangers of retaliatory practices by foreign governments an-
gered by rules of jurisdiction applied by U.S. states. In Japan Line, the
Court noted that "California's tax ... creates an asymmetry in interna-
tional maritime taxation operating to Japan's disadvantage. The risk of
retaliation by Japan, under these circumstances, is acute, and such re-
taliation of necessity would be felt by the Nation as a whole."9 The
risks are the same in the law of jurisdiction. In the area of personal
jurisdiction, in fact, some nations practice automatic retaliation, having
enacted statutes which authorize their courts to exercise jurisdiction
over a foreign defendant whenever the defendant's nation would do the
same in analogous circumstances. 8 It is quite conceivable that expan-
sive exercises of jurisdiction by even one U.S. state could result in all
U.S. citizens being subject to such jurisdiction in the courts of the af-
fronted nation.99 A uniform federal policy, on the other hand, would
prevent the effects of one state's sins from being visited on the heads of
the entire nation.
2.2. The Need for Comity
Part 2.1 argues that the goal of having the nation speak with one
voice in regulating commercial relations with foreign governments is
defeated by the bewildering variety of state and federal jurisdictional
rules that apply to international cases. In this section, the article con-
tends that specific rules adopted by some U.S. jurisdictions and opin-
ions issued by some U.S. courts impact adversely on U.S. foreign rela-
tions by needlessly antagonizing other countries. These judicial lapses
of comity frustrate the policies, offend the sovereignty, and disparage
the legal systems of foreign nations.
9 Moore, supra note 77, at 255.
9 Id. at 265.
97 441 U.S. at 453. In an omitted footnote, the Court noted that automatic retalia-
tion by some nations might result from the California tax.
" Belgium, Italy, Austria, and Portugal are examples. See Born, supra note 8, at
15.
9 See id. at 33 & n.139.
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2.2.1. Frustration of Foreign States' Policies
State courts sometimes assert local policy interests to justify reten-
tion of international cases or application of state law instead of foreign
law. The unhappy result, however, may be a foreign nation angered by
the frustration of its policies.
For example, Corrigan v. Bjork Shiley Corp.'0 0 was a wrongful
death suit against the manufacturer of a heart valve that allegedly frag-
mented and caused the death of an Australian citizen in whom the de-
vice had been implanted by Australian doctors in an Australian hospi-
tal. The California Court of Appeal found that, were the case to be
tried in Australia, the courts there would apply Australian law,' 0 '
under which discovery would be less liberal than under California law,
and causes of action for strict liability and breach of warranty "would
be circumscribed, as would certain elements of damage."'0 2 Nonethe-
less, the court decided that Australia had little interest in preventing its
citizens from taking advantage of the more generous provisions of Cali-
fornia law,'0 3 whereas California had an "important interest in regu-
lating products manufactured in California. 4"' 0
What the court failed to realize, however, was that these Austra-
lian rules that make tort recovery more difficult can be viewed as ele-
ments of a coherent Australian trade policy, aimed at encouraging for-
eign manufacturers to export high technology products to Australia.
Heart valves, for example, are meant for seriously ill patients; whatever
their dangers, Australians dying of heart disease are better off with
them than without them. By imposing a negligence standard of liability
on their design and manufacture, and by enacting other rules limiting
tort recoveries for its citizens, Australia has pegged the balance between
benefits and risks at the particular level that it has determined is
best.' 5 This decision is frustrated, however, if U.S. manufacturers
withhold products such as heart valves from the Australian market be-
cause of a fear of being held to a strict liability standard in tort actions
in U.S. courts.
'1 182 Cal. App. 3d 166, 227 Cal. Rptr. 247 (1986).
101 Id. at 179, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 254.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 180, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 255.
104 Id.
105 The Corrigan court did not recognize this Australian interest, but rather as-
serted that California has an important interest in regulating products manufactured
there. Id. The Supreme Court responded to a similar assertion in Reyno, however, by
pointing out that "the incremental deterrence [of U.S. manufacturers from producing
defective products] that would be gained if this trial were held in [a U.S.] court is likely
to be insignificant." 454 U.S. at 260-61.
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Similarly, the Reyno holding that the forum choice of foreign
plaintiffs deserves reduced deference108 is consistent with the interest of
foreign nations in deciding in local courts suits arising locally. 10 7 In
Reyno, Scottish citizens were injured at home; Scotland had the right to
resolve disputes arising from the accident by applying its own law in its
own courts.Y 8 When a U.S. court provides an alternate forum for a
foreign citizen injured in his home nation, it undercuts the policies of
that nation. This is so because nations balance many factors in deciding
on a trade policy, and the results of this balancing are reflected in the
rules of decision that they adopt to govern tort recoveries in their
courts.
Many lower federal courts have more explicitly recognized that it
is improper to hamper the trade policies of foreign nations by allowing
their residents to take advantage of generous U.S. tort liability rules.Y0 9
In Harrison v. Wyeth Laboratories,1 " for example, residents of the
United Kingdom brought products liability suits in federal district court
against U.S. companies that manufactured oral contraceptives. The
court dismissed the suits as more appropriately heard in the United
Kingdom:
[Blalancing of the overall benefits to be derived from a prod-
uct's use with the risk of harm associated with that use is
peculiarly suited to a forum of the country in which the
product is to be used. Each country has its own legitimate
concerns and its own unique needs which must be factored
into its process of weighing the drug's merits, and which will
tip the balance for it one way or the other. . . . [I]t is mani-
festly unfair to the defendant, as well as an inappropriate
usurpation of a foreign court's proper authority to decide a
108 454 U.S. at 255-56.
107 "[Tihere is 'a local interest in having localized controversies decided at
home.'" Id. at 260 (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 509 (1947)).
108 As the Reyno Court noted, "Scotland has a very strong interest in this litiga-
tion. The accident occurred in its airspace. All of the decedents were Scottish." Id.
10I See, e.g., Ledingham v. Parke-Davis Div. of Warner-Lambert Co., 628 F.
Supp. 1447, 1451 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) ("[W]hen a regulated industry, such as the phar-
maceutical industry, is involved in an action, the country where the injury occurs has a
particularly strong interest in the litigation."); Fraizer v. St. Jude Medical, Inc., 609 F.
Supp. 1129, 1131-32 (D. Minn. 1985) ("Denmark has a significant interest in setting
the standards that a foreign manufacturer must meet to sell products there."); cf. Lau-
ritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 575 (1953) (holding that granting a U.S. remedy to an
injured Danish seaman "would sharply conflict with the policy and letter of Danish
law"). But see Carlenstolpe v. Merck & Co., 638 F. Supp. 901, 909 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(holding that the interest of the U.S. forum where the drug has been manufactured "is
at least equal to that of the foreign citizen's home forum").
10 510 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
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matter of local interest, for a court in this country to set a
higher standard of care than is required by the government
of the country in which the product is sold and used. al l
In an analogous line of cases involving forum selection clauses, the
Supreme Court has considered the foreign policy implications of U.S.
courts' retaining jurisdiction of cases more properly decided elsewhere,
and ruled that such cases should be dismissed. In MIS Bremen v.
Zapata Off-Shore Co.,112 for example, putting aside the disfavor in
which forum selection clauses have traditionally been held by U.S.
courts,1"' the Court held that dismissal of the case in compliance with
the clause was appropriate:
The expansion of [U.S.] business and industry will hardly be
encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist on
a parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved under
our laws and in our courts. . . We cannot have trade and
commerce in world markets and international waters exclu-
sively on our terms, governed by our laws and resolved in
our courts.'
In the same way, U.S. trade with foreign nations will suffer if busi-
nesses fear that U.S. courts will ignore the policy determinations of the
United States' trading partners by applying U.S. law to foreign citizens
injured abroad. 15
... Id. at 4-5. The court pointed out that were the alternate forum a country less
similar to the United States than is the United Kingdom-if it were India, for exam-
ple-there would be even greater impropriety in affording the foreign plaintiffs a fo-
rum in the United States:
Faced with different needs, problems and resources . . . India may, in
balancing the pros and cons of a drug's use, give different weight to vari-
ous factors than would our society, and more easily conclude that any risks
associated with the use of a particular oral contraceptive are far out-
weighed by its overall benefits to India and its people. Should we impose
our standards upon them in spite of such differences? We think not.
Id.; cf. In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in Dec. 1984,
634 F. Supp. 842, 865 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (finding that public interests of India in adju-
dicating claims stemming from gas leak there far outweigh those of the United States).
111 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
a See L. BRILMAYER, supra note 7, at 33.
114 407 U.S. at 9; see also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629 (1985) (holding that "concerns of international comity [and]
respect for the capacities of foreign and transnational tribunals," inter alia, mandated
enforcement of international arbitration clause, "even assuming that a contrary result
would be forthcoming in a domestic context"); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S.
506 (1974) (enforcing arbitration clause in international context).
11 See also Note, Foreign Plaintiffs and Forum Non Conveniens: Going Beyond
Reyno, 64 TEx L. REv. 193, 223 (1985) (arguing that "the application of [a U.S.]
forum's law to controversies in which other countries have a vital interest is likely to
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2.2.2. Offenses to Foreign Sovereignty
Foreign states justifiably resent overly expansive U.S. assertions of
personal jurisdiction and unduly jingoistic U.S. choice of law determi-
nations. In the area of jurisdiction, the aggressive practices of U.S.
courts" 6 have had tangible negative effects on foreign policy. In the
1970s, the United States and the United Kingdom negotiated on a pro-
posed bilateral convention"" liberalizing the laws of enforcement of
judgments between the two countries."' However, the United Kingdom
withdrew from the negotiations after British industry claimed that the
Convention would require recognition by British courts of exorbitant
jurisdictional claims by U.S. courts." 9 Thus, a treaty beneficial to the
nation was lost because of the federal failure to check the jurisdictional
excesses of some U.S. courts.
In the area of choice of law, similarly, the interest analysis tech-
nique employed by some U.S. courts is often criticized for its tendency
to select the law of the forum, based on its assumption that local laws
are designed to benefit local residents.' 20 This approach does not pay
sufficient attention to the special problems of transnational litigation.
The international order relies on the comity of nations; the United
States violates this comity whenever it applies its own law to a case in
which another country has a stronger interest. In the words of one for-
eign commentator:
[T]he problem... is whether a state member of the interna-
tional community can rightly respond to the quest [for] ap-
plicable law in international conflicts cases by adopting a
methodology which consists, by definition, of an aggressive
unilateralist approach and can virtually produce solutions
that are inherently indifferent to considerations dictated by
an actually growing and politically desirable social, eco-
nomic, and cultural intercourse among the nations.12 '
offend the sovereignty or frustrate the public policies of those countries").
116 See supra text accompanying note 10.
127 Proposed Convention on the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judg-
ments in Civil Matters, Nov. 26, 1976, United States-United Kingdom, reprinted in 16
I.L.M. 71 (1977).
.18 Born, supra note 8, at 29 n.122.
11 Id. (citing North, The Draft U.K.iU.S. Judgments Convention: A British
Viewpoint, 1 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 219, 233-38 (1979)). Born notes that foreign
protests are especially likely when U.S. courts assert jurisdiction in order to apply
"public-policy based statutes like the antitrust laws." Id. at 19 n.86; see, e.g., In re
Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248, 1253-56 (7th Cir. 1980) (applying the
Sherman Act to antitrust activity outside of the United States).
120 See L. BRILMAYER, supra note 7, at 241-42.
121 Evrigenis, Interest Analysis: A Continental Perspective, 46 OHIO ST. L.J.
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It is not surprising that foreign sovereigns are offended by U.S. courts'
use of a choice of law approach that ignores or gives little attention to
international harmony but places great emphasis on local policy
interests.
2.2.3. Disparagement of Foreign Legal Systems
In Zschernig v. Miller,122 the Supreme Court invalidated an Ore-
gon statute that, as applied, prevented citizens of certain countries from
inheriting personal property in Oregon."' 3 The chief basis for the deci-
sion was the Court's concern that under the challenged Oregon law and
under similar laws in other states, state courts had "launched inquiries
into the type of governments that obtain[ed] in particular foreign na-
tions." '124 The Court ruled that this type of inquiry was an impermissi-
ble "state involvement in foreign affairs and international rela-
tions-matters which the Constitution entrusts solely to the Federal
Government."' 25
In applying jurisdictional rules, some state courts have engaged in
similar criticisms of foreign nations. In Holmes v. Syntex Laborato-
ries, 2 ' for example, a products liability suit by British citizens against
three U.S. companies for damages allegedly caused by an oral contra-
ceptive, an appeals court ruled that California law (1) affords substan-
tial deference to the choice of forum of all plaintiffs, foreign and resi-
dent, '2 and (2) attaches great significance to the possibility that a
forum non conveniens dismissal will result in a change in applicable
law that disfavors the plaintiff by depriving him of a "suitable" alter-
native forum. 2' The court then held that "a review of Britain's conflict
of law rules and its current substantive law of products liability demon-
strates that the British courts are not a suitable alternative."' 2 9 After
examining the applicable British law at length, the court concluded that
525, 526-27 (1985).
122 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
123 The statute provided for escheat unless there existed (1) a reciprocal right of
U.S. citizens to inherit property on the same terms as citizens of the heir's home nation;
(2) a right of U.S. citizens to receive payments here of funds from estates in the foreign
country; and (3) a right of the foreign heirs to receive the proceeds of Oregon estates
without confiscation by the foreign government. OR. REV. STAT. § 111.070 (1957)
(repealed 1969).
124 389 U.S. at 434.
125 Id. at 436.
126 156 Cal. App. 3d 372, 202 Cal. Rptr. 773 (1984).
127 Id. at 380-81, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 778.
12 Id. at 381, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 778-79. "To the extent [Reyno] departs from
California law," the court concluded, "it is inapposite." Id. at 382, 202 Cal. Rptr. at
779.
129 Id. at 383, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 780 (emphasis in original).
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"the British themselves have condemned as inadequate [British law] in
the field of defective products."1 '
What the court failed to see, however, is that it is for the British
Parliament, not the California courts, to decide what kind of products
liability law is appropriately applied to cases involving British citizens
injured in Britain. The judicial condemnation of British law indulged
in by the Holmes court is precisely the sort of offensive state behavior
that the Zschernig decision aimed to prevent.
Courts sometimes also criticize foreign legal systems when consid-
ering whether to enforce foreign judgments. For example, in cases in
which jurisdiction was litigated in the foreign court or the right to liti-
gate jurisdiction was waived, while most U.S. courts will not reexamine
the issue, some will independently reexamine the bases of jurisdiction of
the foreign court. 3 ' This procedure gives the unsuccessful litigant a
free second chance, implying that the domestic court views the foreign
court's disposition of the issue as somehow not sufficiently reliable to be
recognized in this country. Another example would be a case in which
a state court refused to enforce a foreign judgment on the grounds that
the rendering nation did not possess impartial tribunals."3 2
3. JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL CASES: A NEW
APPROACH
Part 2 of this article demonstrates that the ad hoc approach of
current law to the special problems presented by transnational litiga-
tion has resulted in a national cacophony of voices, some of them eu-
phonious but some of them strident, in an area of foreign policy. In
Part 3, after demonstrating that the Supreme Court has embraced the
promulgation of federal common law in the foreign relations domain,
the article proposes an integrated approach to jurisdictional issues in
international cases.
... Id. at 387, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 782.
131 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 481 reporters' note
3 at 600 (1986) (citing Hunt v. BP Exploration Co. (Libya), 492 F. Supp. 885 (N.D.
Tex. 1980)).
132 As long as jurisdictional issues in international cases are a matter of state law,
the Supreme Court has no jurisdictional basis for reviewing state court decisions that
refuse to grant appropriate deference to foreign interests or that offensively criticize
foreign legal systems. If state courts must apply federal law in international cases, how-
ever, then the federal judicial oversight that is needed will be possible. See L. HENKIN,
supra note 73, at 219 & n.48.
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3.1. Federal Common Law
3.1.1. Introduction
In Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,13 the Supreme Court an-
nounced that "[t]here is no federal general common law."'" 4 Since that
time, however, numerous cases have made clear that in some areas of
the law, there is indeed a federal common law, binding on state courts
and lower federal courts alike.
There are two types of post-Erie federal common law. One type
evolves when either the Constitution or a federal statute supplies a ba-
sis for federal jurisdiction over a certain area of law and implicitly au-
thorizes judicial development of substantive federal law to govern cases
that arise.13 5 Admiralty is the foremost example under the Constitu-
tion, 386 while cases involving disputes between labor and management
over contract violations constitute one area of federal statutory common
law.137 State courts are likewise required to apply federal common law
when deciding cases that arise under federal statutes so that "the fed-
eral Act [is] given that uniform application throughout the country es-
sential to effectuate its purposes."'38
The other type of federal common law is made by courts "in cases
raising issues of uniquely federal concern."' 39 In a companion case de-
cided on the same day as Erie, the Supreme Court established a federal
common law of interstate water rights.' 40 Similarly, in a case involving
commercial paper issued by the federal government, the Court held that
the rights and duties of the United States are defined by federal com-
mon law.141 It has been suggested that the same logic mandates that
international law, too, be applied in U.S. courts as federal common
133 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
134 Id. at 78.
135 See Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 96 n.35
(1981).
1' See, e.g., Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256,
259 (1979); Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 20-21 (1963).
137 See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448 (1956).
The statute conferring federal jurisdiction is the Labor Management Relations Act §
301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982).
13 Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 361 (1952).
139 Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 95.
140 See Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92
(1938); see also Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 103 (1972) ("When we
deal with air and water in their ambient or interstate aspects, there is a federal com-
mon law .... ") (footnote omitted).
141 See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943); see also
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 305 (1947) (holding that the question
of whether a tortfeasor is liable for government losses stemming from injuries to a
soldier is governed by federal common law).
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law. 42 Finally, the Court has indicated that federal common law is
suitable in the area of "international disputes implicating . . . our rela-
tions with foreign nations.' 43
3.1.2. Foreign Relations and Federal Common Law
It has long been recognized by the Supreme Court that foreign
relations is the quintessential matter that must be subject to federal
control.' 4 To offer just one famous quotation: "[I]n respect of our for-
eign relations generally, state lines disappear. As to such purpose the
State of New York does not exist.' 1 45 One means used by the judicial
branch to exercise federal control over foreign relations is to establish
federal common law.
The leading case on foreign relations and federal common law is
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,'1 46 involving the act of state
doctrine.' 4 7 In Sabbatino, the Court held that the act of state doctrine is
not binding international law, but rather has "underpinnings" in the
constitutional system of separation of powers. 148 The Court stressed
that the doctrine is exclusively federal common law:
[I]t is plain that the problems involved are uniquely federal
in nature. If federal authority, in this instance this Court,
142 See Jessup, The Doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Applied to Interna-
tional Law, 33 Am. J. INT'L L. 740, 743 (1939); see also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630
F.2d 876, 886-87 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that the law of nations is part of the common
law of the United States); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425
(1964) (dictum) (citing Jessup's argument approvingly).
a Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981).
144 Cf. THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 302 (J. Madison) (B. Wright ed. 1961) ("If
we are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to other
nations.").
145 United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937); see also L. HENKIN,
supra note 73, at 227 & nn.1-2 (listing a number of similar quotations).
14. 376 U.S. 398 (1964). In Sabbatino, a U.S. commodity broker contracted to
buy sugar from a Cuban corporation largely owned by U.S. residents. The Cuban
government expropriated the corporation, however, and after taking delivery of the
sugar, the broker refused to pay for it. Banco Nacional, a Cuban instrumentality to
which the bills of lading had been assigned, sued in federal district court. The court
granted summary judgment for the defendants, however, ruling that the act of state
doctrine did not protect the Cuban action from judicial inquiry in this country because
the expropriation had violated international law. The court of appeals affirmed, and
the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the act of state doctrine was applicable de-
spite the alleged violation of international law.
1 7 The act of state doctrine provides that "the courts of one country will not sit in
judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own territory. Re-
dress of grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open to
be availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves." Underhill v. Hernandez, 168
U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
148 376 U.S. at 423.
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orders the field of judicial competence in this area for the
federal courts, and the state courts are left free to formulate
their own rules, the purposes behind the doctrine could be as
effectively undermined as if there had been no federal pro-
nouncement on the subject. . . [W]e are constrained to
make it clear that an issue concerned with a basic choice re-
garding the competence and function of the Judiciary and
the National Executive in ordering our relationships with
other members of the international community must be
treated exclusively as an aspect of federal law. 49
The Court was concerned that "legal problems affecting international
relations . .. not be left to divergent and perhaps parochial state
interpretations."' 50
Professor Henkin has pointed out the far-reaching implications of
the Court's decision in Sabbatino:
Sabbatino establishes foreign affairs as a domain in which
federal courts can make law with supremacy. There ought to
be little doubt, then, that in the established areas of judicial
lawmaking, law that is substantially related to foreign af-
fairs-the determination of customary international law and
comity for judicial purposes; ... the principles of (interna-
tional) conflicts of laws; rules as to . . . the treatment of
foreign judgments-the federal courts can make law for
their own guidance and can decide also whether federal in-
terests require that the states conform to them.'51
Thus, Sabbatino firmly established that in the area of foreign relations,
the Supreme Court has the power to make law binding on state and
federal courts alike as federal common law.
3.2. A Proposed Solution
In response to the shortcomings of the current approach to juris-
149 Id. at 424. In an omitted footnote, the Court noted that it was unnecessary to
consider whether a state court could permissibly adhere to a more restrictive view than
that required by the Supreme Court concerning the scope of examinations of foreign
acts. 1a. Id.; cf. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980) (lauding
wisdom of first Congress in vesting jurisdiction in federal courts over suits by aliens
relating to torts committed in violation of international law, since questions of forum
non conveniens and other issues in such cases "are fraught with implications for the
nation as a whole, and therefore should not be left to the potentially varying adjudica-
tions of the courts of the fifty states").
151 L. HENKIN, supra note 73, at 219 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
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dictional issues in transnational cases in U.S. courts, this article pro-
poses an alternative framework. Courts considering these issues cur-
rently use a variety of analytical methods, all of which share the fault
of giving only cursory attention-if indeed any attention at all-to the
foreign policy implications of the results to which they lead. In contrast,
this article advocates a basic, general approach to jurisdictional issues
that explicitly factors in the foreign relations effects of judicial decisions
in international cases. The proposed method has two goals: (1) to treat
individual litigants fairly and (2) to promote international harmony
and the smooth functioning of the multinational system by affording
respect to foreign states and by carefully considering their interests.
The suggested approach is as follows: in international cases, courts
should decide jurisdictional issues by analyzing not only the connections
among the litigants, the litigation, and the forum, but also the relevant
policies of the United States and the interested foreign state. The inclu-
sion of foreign policy concerns in the jurisdictional calculus distin-
guishes the proposed method from that used by many courts under pre-
sent law. Currently, most courts decide whether or not to assert
personal jurisdiction over a foreign litigant by looking only at the con-
tacts between the defendant and the forum; 152 in ruling on forum non
conveniens motions and deciding choice of law questions, some courts
regard as important the policies of only the forum state;' 53 and courts
sometimes refuse enforcement to foreign judgments on the sole ground
that local public policy is contrary.1
54
In contrast, the proposed approach will ensure that courts take
into account the international context of a case in deciding jurisdictional
issues. Thus, if an alien defendant challenges a U.S. court's assertion of
personal jurisdiction, the court should first look at minimum contacts,
as in a purely domestic case; if they are not present, then assertion of
jurisdiction is forbidden by the due process clause. If minimum contacts
are found to exist, however, so that the defendant cannot complain of
having been denied "fair play and substantial justice,' 55 the inquiry
should not end; the next question is, will the policies of other nations be
adversely affected by the court's exercise of jurisdiction?156 If the an-
152 See, e.g., Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408
(1984). But cf. infra note 156.
153 See, e.g., Corrigan v. Bjork-Shiley Corp., 182 Cal. App. 3d 166, 227 Cal.
Rptr. 247 (1986).
154 See, e.g., Mann v. Compania Petrolera Trans-Cuba, S.A., 32 Misc. 2d 790,
223 N.Y.S.2d 900 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
155 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
151 In Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Solano County, 480 U.S.
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swer is no, then the court may exercise jurisdiction. Otherwise, how-
ever, the court must find that the assertion of jurisdiction is unreasona-
ble unless a strong policy interest of the United States argues in favor
of retention of the case.15
If personal jurisdiction is not at issue, or if the court has found
that exercising jurisdiction is reasonable under the circumstances of the
case, the court may have to consider a motion for dismissal on the
grounds of forum non conveniens. Again, the question it must ask is,
will the policies of other nations be adversely affected if the case is tried
in the United States? If the answer is no, then the court should decide
the motion on the basis of the traditional forum non conveniens fac-
tors.158 If, however, the court finds that another nation would be of-
fended or its policies frustrated by trial of the litigation in the United
States, then the case should be dismissed, unless (1) the traditional fo-
rum non conveniens factors strongly suggest retention or (2) a strong
policy interest of the United States requires that a domestic forum hear
the case.
The same framework of analysis should govern choice of law
questions. Whenever a court decides to preside over an international
case, the next question it will face is what law to apply. If the court
finds that no other nation has a significant interest in having its law
selected, then it should choose U.S. law. If, on the other hand, the court
determines that another nation does have important policies at stake,
and the United States does not, then the law of that other country
should be employed. If significant policies of more than one nation
clash, then the court should balance the competing interests and choose
the weightiest. 5 '
Finally, when the issue presented is whether or not to enforce a
102 (1987), the Court for the first time suggested that state courts look at the policies of
other nations before exercising personal jurisdiction over alien defendants. Id. at 115.
The Court recommended "a careful inquiry into the reasonableness of the assertion of
jurisdiction in the particular case, and an unwillingness to find the serious burdens on
an alien defendant outweighed by minimal interests on the part of the plaintiff or the
forum state." Id. at 116. However, the Court did not move beyond the facts of the case
to decide how much weight lower courts in future cases should give to transnational
factors, nor did it provide guidance for disputes involving alien defendants in which two
or more states have legitimate interests.
1" Purely local policy interests should be insufficient to support the assertion of
jurisdiction in cases in which the policies of other nations, and hence the foreign policy
of the United States, will be adversely impacted.
'5 See supra text accompanying notes 16-19.
119 This balancing approach is similar to Professor Baxter's comparative impair-
ment test, see Baxter, supra note 47, at 8-9, 17-22, and to the Second Restatement's
consideration of the relative strengths of the interests of the forum and other interested
states, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971).
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foreign judgment, there should be a presumption that the judgment is
to be enforced. A harmonious international system requires each na-
tion's courts to enforce valid judgments issued by the courts of sister
nations, and the United States should take a leading role in promoting
worldwide respect for law. Only a strong, contrary policy interest of the
United States should permit a court to refuse to enforce a foreign
judgment.
Figure I illustrates the decision process of a judge applying the
proposed approach to questions of personal jurisdiction, forum non con-
veniens, and choice of law in an international case.
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FIGURE I
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3.3. The Proposed Solution in Operation
In order to convey a more concrete understanding of the approach
suggested by this article, and to explore more fully some of its ramifica-
tions, it is useful to posit a hypothetical case. Thus, suppose that
TanksLoads, a French subsidiary of the U.S. munitions corporation
ArmsAgeddon, operates a plant in the small town of Revolve, thirty
kilometers west of Paris. The plant supplies tanks to the armies of
France, the United States, Italy, and the Benelux nations. In May
1988, factory employees of North African descent file a class action suit
against the two companies in a state court in Delaware, where Arms-
Ageddon is incorporated, charging that TanksLoads is denying promo-
tions to workers at the French plant on the basis of race, in violation of
the laws of both France and Delaware, and seeking injunctive and
monetary relief. The complaint alleges that the hiring practices at the
Revolv6 plant are mandated by ArmsAgeddon's top management as
part of a racially discriminatory policy in place throughout all branches
of the corporation.
In dealing with the jurisdictional questions raised by this case, the
typical trial court would examine such issues as the contacts between
the French company and Delaware, the location of pertinent docu-
ments, and the intentions of the state legislature regarding application
of Delaware's civil rights law to foreign subsidiaries of local corpora-
tions. Only the exceptional state or federal judge might look beyond
these concerns and recognize that a case such as this one raises delicate
international issues, requiring analysis of both French policies and U.S.
foreign affairs interests. Using this article's suggested approach, how-
ever, the trial court hearing this suit would have a framework within
which to address these critical foreign policy questions.
When the case is called, TanksLoads might begin defense of the
suit by filing a special appearance challenging the assertion of jurisdic-
tion over it by the Delaware court. Assuming that minimum contacts
are found-based perhaps on the sale of tanks by the French subsidiary
to the U.S. army and/or the parent company's incorporation in Dela-
ware-the court must then consider whether any French policies would
be adversely affected by a U.S. court's exercise of jurisdiction over
TanksLoads. It is easy to see that France might well have quite signifi-
cant objections to having an important French armsmaker hauled
before a U.S. tribunal. If the trial court were to so find, then it would
not exercise jurisdiction over TanksLoads unless a strong policy interest
of the United States argues for retention of the case. If the court were
to find that the United States has such an interest, for example in
preventing its businesses from forcing subsidiaries to engage in racially
[Vol. 10:4
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol10/iss4/4
JURISDICTION IN TRANSNATIONAL CASES
discriminatory behavior abroad, then it would exercise personal juris-
diction over both defendants.
It is worthwhile to pause at this point to consider how a court
should ascertain the pertinent policies of interested foreign states and of
the United States. Sometimes, this task will be easy, as when a govern-
ment files an amicus curiae brief or otherwise communicates its posi-
tion to the court, 160 or when debates in the legislature or pronounce-
ments by the executive branch make government policy clear.16 In
difficult cases, in fact, a court would be acting well within its discretion
if it requested guidance from the relevant government, much as a fed-
eral court will sometimes certify a question to the highest court of a
state. Otherwise, the court must balance a variety of factors and reach
the best answer it can. Some of these factors may be statements by
legislators and government officials, inferences that can be drawn from
the purposes of the particular law at issue or from the general pattern
of a nation's laws, precepts of international law, and common sense
assessment of the goals and values of nations and their citizens.
To illustrate,' suppose that the Delaware court in the hypothetical
case asserts jurisdiction over both defendants and moves on to determine
which nation's law to select. The first issue for consideration under the
proposed approach is whether or not France has a significant interest
in having its law applied. If the two competing jurisdictions have simi-
lar laws on this issue, but French law provides double damages and
Delaware law treble, it would seem clear that France does not have a
strong interest in the application of its law. On the other hand, if
French law exempts munitions companies from civil rights require-
ments for national security reasons, it would seem readily apparent that
France does have important interests at stake. If the French policy is
less clear, the court might look at whether or not France is a party to
international conventions barring racial discrimination, whether the
French have in the past objected to a foreign nation's applying its law
to activities of a French subsidiary of a parent company located in that
nation, and whether the French government has taken any position on
16O However, at least in the act of state context, the Supreme Court appears to
have overruled the so-called Bernstein exception and held that the judiciary is not
bound by U.S. Executive Branch statements to the courts about what is or is not in the
nation's foreign policy interest. See First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba,
406 U.S. 759, 776 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (calculating that six members of the
Court were voting to overturn Bernstein).
161 Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403 reporters'
note 6 (1986) (discussing how courts can determine state interests when judging the
reasonableness of an exercise of jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to foreign
persons or activities).
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attempts by the North African workers to pursue domestic remedies, to
name a few of the possible avenues the court could pursue. Obviously,
the parties litigating the issue can be expected to assist the court by
putting forward the best possible arguments for either side.
If the court were to determine that French policy would demand
the application of French law, it would turn to an examination of U.S.
policy. Soliciting guidance from the Justice Department would be one
effective means of obtaining information. Another might be to look at
the policies that inspired the federal civil rights laws and to analyze
whether those policies would support application of those laws to a case
involving a U.S. company directing a foreign subsidiary to implement
racially discriminatory hiring practices. Also pertinent would be the
law with respect to regulation of foreign subsidiaries generally.'6 2 Once
it had examined these factors and assessed their applicability and
weight, the court could determine the significance of the U.S. policy
interests at stake in the litigation.
To take the hypothetical case one step further, suppose the court
were to find that both nations have significant interests in having their
law applied. The judge would then balance the competing interests and
determine which of the conflicting policies would be more damaged if
the other prevailed in this instance. If, for example, the strongly
worded French civil rights law makes no mention of exemptions on
national security grounds but another French law prohibits courts from
issuing any injunction that would "disrupt operations" at an arms
plant, the court might conclude that enforcing civil rights at Tanks-
Loads would be less disruptive than a strike by the North African
workers, and that therefore, the choice of U.S. law would be superior.
Such a result would advance the anti-discrimination policies of both
countries and would be minimally disruptive of operations at the
French tankfactory. Moreover, it bears noting that the approach advo-
cated here does not involve U.S. courts in evaluating the legitimacy of
foreign states' policies, an exercise likely to give offense to governments
abroad. Rather, the court wrestling with these issues seeks to identify
the relevant policies of the foreign state and assess their significance to
that state, in order to ensure that it frustrates these policies as little as
possible, if at all. 63
As a final illustration of the suggested approach to jurisdictional
issues in international cases, assume that the Delaware judge dismisses
the lawsuit in the hypothetical case on the grounds of forum non con-
162 See id. § 414.
163 See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 615 n.34 (9th Cir.
1976).
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veniens. Trial proceeds in France, and ultimately, a court finds that
ArmsAgeddon's top managers have developed a policy of systematic ra-
cial discrimination which they have imposed throughout the company's
operations, and orders appropriate relief for the workers in Revolv6.
Subsequently, the plaintiffs return to court in Delaware to collect the
damages awarded by the judgment against ArmsAgeddon, and the com-
pany asserts that the French court lacked jurisdiction over it. Under the
present proposal, the Delaware judge would proceed by presuming that
the French decree was valid; the burden would be on ArmsAgeddon to
prove that the issuing court lacked jurisdiction.
4. CONCLUSION
If the international system is to thrive, nations must respect each
other's interests. For too long, however, the U.S. approach to jurisdic-
tional issues in international cases has been at best to ignore their inter-
national implications, at worst to wield them as weapons on the battle-
field of power politics. Now, it is time for the United States to commit
itself to becoming a responsible, responsive member of the world
community.
Obviously, this article's proposal-that the United States adopt a
federal common law of jurisdiction in transnational cases which explic-
itly considers the international implications of U.S. court decisions-is
but a beginning. However, adoption by the courts of this country of the
suggested approach would indicate that the United States takes seri-
ously its role as a global citizen, and as such would be an important
step towards a more harmonious international order of law.
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